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The December 11, 2024 media advisory didn’t specify the exact nature of the next day’s announcement, but the topic—and the outcome—were the worst kept secret of the year.

A “historic partnership announcement” involving the premiers of N.L. and Q.C.? One that would also include each province’s respective energy ministers? And the president and CEO of Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro, a person who had, since May 2022, been investigating ways and means of maximizing long-term benefits for N.L. from its Churchill Falls assets? What else could it be but an amicable resolution—the political heavyweights a clear indication of pending goodwill—to decades of dispute over a lopsided Churchill Falls contract?

There are countless accounts of how the Churchill Falls hydroelectric generating station came into existence. The much-abbreviated version is that the project was initially a partnership between private sector interests in N.L. and Q.C., until electricity production became a provincial concern and the provinces—through Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro (NLH) and Hydro-Québec (HQ)—took over. Though N.L. was the majority owner, it ran short on financing during the early stages of construction; Québec, via HQ, stepped up with the required investment, savvily negotiating favorable concessions in return.

Between 1969 and 2024, HQ (i.e. the Province of Québec) had access to roughly 90 per cent of the power produced, at fixed rates that failed to escalate in line with evolving market rates—power they then resold at a significant profit. Over a 55-year period, HQ earned $28 billion on Churchill Falls’ power, compared to NLH’s $2 billion. The bottom line, for generations of Newfoundlanders and Labradorians, was that Churchill Falls was synonymous with “raw deal”. And it wasn’t due to expire until 2041.

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